Security within computing systems is ambiguous, proliferated through obscurity, a knowledgeable user, or plain luck. Presented is a novel concept for structuring computing systems to achieve a higher degree of overall system security through the compartmentalization and isolation of executed instructions for each component. Envisioned is a scalable model which focuses on lower level operations to alleviate the view of security as a binary outcome to that of a deterministic metric based on a set of independent characteristics.
Introduction
Computing System(s) (CS) have evolved rapidly in a short time, but have been forced to enforce security through obscurity rather than design [6] , resulting in many security vulnerabilities stemming from the flaws in the underlying architectural design. The Von-Neumann architecture has greatly influenced the design of commodity CS, however, the architecture design never incorporated security as a core requirement, rendering it unable to support modern day CS [3] . This paper proposes a framework to enforce security through design by applying a comprehensive definition of security to each component within a functional CS enforced by a set of structuring monitors to compartmentalize and isolate component operations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines relevant literature, Section 3 outlines the proposed framework, Section 4 provides a concise conceptual evaluation, and Section 5 provides a conclusion and directions for future research.
Background
From the reviewed literature, a deterministic model for a secure CS based on enforceable characteristics has never been proposed. Existing approaches can be categorized as follows:
System Based: One of the oldest approaches with a strong niche in government and military organizations, but suffered from unclear distinction between confidentiality and integrity [8] . For e.g. MULTICS [13] , KSOS [11] , PSOS [12] , EROS [14] , etc.
Software Based: Include the use of micro kernels [15] , and virtualization [7] , but suffered from high operational overheads, and challenges arising from incorrect administration [16] .
Hardware Based: Aim to enforce security through hardware but cannot prevent software attacks and are susceptible to compromised hardware. For e.g. Microsoft's NGSCB [1] which implemented the Trusted Platform Module [10] .
Many of the proposed approaches suffer from an over dependence on the Operating System (OS). Structuring the OS to enforce security was proposed by Hoare [5] , and implemented as part of a hierarchical design, similar to protection rings, by Lister and Sayer [9] . However, protecting ring 0 from itself has always been an open challenge [2] .
The Proposed Framework
The proposed framework segments the CS to consist of Hardware, OS, Services, Applications, and Users. Considering any CS, as functionality is rendered through operating code, the most fundamental unit of operation is defined to be a Block of Code (BoC) which is a singular block of operating code consisting of a set of sequential instructions to be executed, at the processor level, in order to provide some desired functionality. With this analogy, each identified component can be represented as a set of BoC which interact together to provide some desirable end result.
To facilitate the deterministic quantification of a BoC, we adopt the definition of security given by Creado et. al. [4] , as a combination of independent characteristics -Is Invulnerable (Inv), Has Integrity (Int), Is Verified (V er), Is Trustworthy (T wy), and Is Secure (Sec); formally generalized for overall system security for any CS Ψ running n BoC as:
The proposed framework advocates the definition of a set of independent monitors to enforce each security characteristic for each BoC as depicted in Fig. 1a . A linear progression between characteristics facilitates the highest probability for secure component operation. As the entire system can be vulnerable to the least secure code executed, therefore by ensuring that each BoC executed adheres to each of the defined security characteristics can assure a higher degree of overall system security. Fig. 1b illustrates the assignment of structuring monitors, which operate independently, to the system as well as to each component in order to compartmentalize and isolate operations, with each monitor defined with the following aspects to govern their operations.
Operational Aspects -govern operations to enforce the monitored security characteristic, and includes -Monitor Class (C) -defines the level of information sharing within the CS 
Theoretical Evaluation
As system compromise is a direct result of the presence of an exploitable vulnerability, a probability space Ω → [0, 1] for all f ∈ F where f is an event with a probability outcome of some a|0 ≤ a ≤ 1 is assumed, wherein a BoC enforces the defined security characteristics through the inclusion of specific operating code to enforce it.
Two hypothetical systems are considered. First, a partially secure commodity system which executes a BoC while enforcing some security characteristics either through included instructions or as code executed at the user's discretion, wherein the code to enforce each security characteristic isn't necessarily isolated. Second, is the proposed system which explicitly mandates the requirement for additional isolated code to enforce each security characteristic, in addition to the definition and operation of monitors to ensure enforcement.
Considering each of the defined security characteristics and their associated instructions as elements within a set, we can apply set theory and probability theory to Eq. 1 to ascertain the degree of security achieved and the impact on performance for a CS Ψ as depicted in Table 1 .
Security Evaluation -For simplicity, considering the associated probabilities for each characteristic to be equal, the most ideal representation of the probability of security for both systems considered is shown in Fig. 2a . We note a strong indicative difference between the p(Sec) for the considered systems. Furthermore, as practical implementations for a partially secure commodity systems do not necessarily enforce each of the defined security characteristics, the resulting probability for partially secure commodity systems may be far lower than the ideal.
Commodity System
Proposed Framework Probability of security p (Sec (Ψ)) can be ascertained from the probabilities of each enforced security characteristic:
Performance impact can be ascertained as the number of instructions (O) executed to provide functionality, enforce each security characteristic, and for monitor operations: Performance Evaluation - Fig. 2b depicts the ideal impact on performance resulting from an increase in the number of instructions executed in order to enforce each of the security characteristics. We note a strong potential for operational overhead with the proposed framework, however, at this stage in the conceptual development, these results are only indicative as implementation level empirical data doesn't exist. However, the relationship between security and performance have been directly correlated to the default number of instructions within the underlying BoC being executed. 
Conclusion
This paper has proposed a conceptual framework to address some of the foundational flaws within existing CS operations. By emphasizing low level operations, specifically pertaining to the defined fundamental unit of operation -a BoC, the framework allows for evaluating existing CS operations and allows for an adaptable model towards proactively ensuring system security based on executed instructions. Future research aims at defining an underlying architecture with logically sound properties for each of the defined security characteristics. For now, the use of conventional CS is unavoidable. The nature of computation has allowed for defining intelligence artificially, but the strive for perfection is still underpinned by dated mechanisms which have been reinforced with band-aid solutions to counter existing vulnerabilities. Performance oriented computing needs to give some room for enforcing security to achieve some level of balance in this inverse correlation.
